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Abstract
In the paper a ﬂexible FHM approach is estimated to model price responses of farm households
under imperfect labor markets. In contrast to former studies the model explicitly incorporates
simultaneously ﬁxed and variable transaction costs as well as heterogeneity. Main results are:
(i) In the general approach non-separability not only occurs if households are autarkic, but also
when households participate in labor markets. (ii) Under imperfect labor markets, price re-
sponses are ambiguous and differ for the non-separable and separable model. However, econo-
metric analysis indicates only moderate differences between the two models except for crop
production for which an inverse supply response is estimated.
Key words: farm household model, labor market, market imperfection1 INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing recognition in agricultural development literature that conventional mi-
croeconomic models are inappropriate to explain farm household behavior when markets are
underdeveloped or absent. This recognition has stimulated the development of farm-household-
models (FHM) that explicitly incorporate the interdependency of production and consumption
decisions on the allocation of household resources (Strauss, 1986; de Janvry et al., 1991). The
early work of the FHM literature focuses on the ability of interdependent FHM to explain some-
times paradox - and even perverse - microeconomic responses of peasants to changes in relative
prices underlining the potential of the FHM approach as an adequate analytical tool to assess the
effects of price and market policy (Strauss, 1986; Lopez, 1984; de Janvry et al., 1991; de Jan-
vry, 1992). In essence, these early FHM approaches argue that market imperfection translates
into transaction costs and if transaction costs are sufﬁciently high households ﬁnd it unprof-
itable to either buy or sell a good on the market, i.e. stay in autarky. Assuming autarky for
some markets implies a non-separable FHM and comparative static results no more coincide
with conventional microeconomic models. Several theoretical and empirical studies have used
the FHM approach to analyze farm household responses under imperfect labor (Lopez, 1986;
Thijssen, 1988; Benjamin, 1992; Jacoby, 1993; Sadoulet et al., 1998), capital (de Janvry, 1992)
or food markets (de Janvry et al., 1991; Goetz, 1992; Omamo, 1998; Skouﬁas, 1994; Abdulai
and Delgado, 1999). But, non-separability makes theoretical and in particular empirical anal-
yses more difﬁcult. Therefore, most empirical analyses apply separable FHM or use reduced
forms of a non-separable FHM. Thus, even nowadays it is still fair to say that comprehensive
empirical analyses of price response of farm households under imperfect markets are still rel-
atively rare in the literature. This is especially regrettable, since empirical analyses would be
especially desirable to assess the question to what extent or under what conditions economic
responses of the farm household theoretically identiﬁed for imperfect markets also translate into
signiﬁcant quantitative effects that are relevant for assessing agricultural policy (Chambers and
Lopez, 1987).
In contrast to the early FHM work, more recent studies focus on the role of transaction
costs and institutions determining households’ decision on market participation (Goetz, 1992;
Key et al., 2000; Vakis et al., 2003; Vance and Geoghegan, 2004). Carter and Yao (2002) and
Carter and Olinto (2003) analyze the role of institutions, e.g. property rights, as determinants
of transaction costs and participation in the capital market. Based on the work of Key et al.
(2000), Vance and Geoghegan (2004) analyze empirically determinants of semi-subsistent and
commercial land use estimating a switching regression model derived from a reduced form of a
non-separable FHM(Vance and Geoghegan, 2004). More generally, Keyet al.(2000) in an inter-
esting paper theoretically analyze the impact of ﬁxed (FTC) and proportional (PTC) transaction
costs on households’ decision to participate in the market and empirically test the importance
of these transaction costs for aggregate supply response. Fixed transaction costs are invariant
to the quantity of the good traded, while proportional transaction costs increase proportionally
with the quantity. Key et al. (2000) consider search, bargaining and labor supervision costs as
FTCs, while they consider transportation and information costs as PTC.
However, since PTCs simply correspond to constant marginal transaction costs, the
question arises if variable marginal transaction costs are also conceivable and if or how the
impact of transaction costs changes if variable transaction costs are included. For example, in
contrast to Key et al. (2000) one might argue that bargaining, screening and enforcement costs
are not ﬁxed, but vary with the quantity traded, e.g. farmers who sell their product, land or labor
on credit may have to use increasing resources to control for opportunistic behavior of buyers
with an increasing quantity sold. Vice versa a farmer buying a product, land or labor on credit
might observe increasing transaction costs for the same reason. Analogously, marginal costs to
1supervise hired labor may increase with the units of hired labor, because the larger the number of
hired workers the higher is the probability of free-riding, the importance of coordination of work
inputs and the effort to control for social conﬂicts among hired workers. Analogously, selling
off-farm labor might involve increasing marginal transaction costs, e.g. some part-time job
might be available nearby the farm, while full-time jobs are only available in larger settlements
farther away from the farm. Analogously, it might be more difﬁcult for an additional family
member to ﬁnd an adequate job implying higher search and bargaining costs. Thus, constant
marginal transaction costs, i.e. PTCs, seem to be only a special case, while in general variable
increasing or decreasing marginal transaction costs should be expected. However, the role of
variable marginal transaction costs (VTC) regarding production and consumption decisions or
market participation, respectively, has not been analyzed within a FHM approach, yet.
Moreover, beyond transaction costs imperfect markets might also correspond to het-
erogeneity of products (Strauss, 1986). For example, family and hired labor may be imperfect
substitutes in agricultural production (Deolalikar and Vijverberg, 1987; Jacoby, 1993). In many
cases the skill of farm family members to work off-farm varies signiﬁcantly, although these vari-
ances often cannot be observed in empirical surveys (Low, 1982, 1986; Sadoulet et al., 1998).
Assuming that the order of supplied off-farm work by family members corresponds to their rel-
ative skills, e.g. the most skilled family members will ﬁrst work off-farm, implies that off-farm
wage is a decreasing function of supplied off-farm work. Analogously, the skills of hired on-
farm labor are often heterogeneous, too, i.e. assuming a constant labor wage the most skilled
labor is hired ﬁrst, which implies that the effective wage rate is increasing in the amount of hired
labor (Benjamin, 1992). Therefore, analogous to increasing VTC, heterogeneity of the quality
of traded goods implies that effective market prices decrease or increase with the supplied or
demanded quantity resulting in a non-separable FHM.
In this paper we provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the price response of
farm-households facing imperfect labor markets allowing for variable marginal transaction costs
and heterogeneity. Technically, transaction costs and heterogeneity of labor are taken into ac-
count by assuming a non-linear labor income function for off-farm labor supply and a non-linear
labor cost function for hired on-farm labor. Theoretically, the curvature properties of the labor
cost and income function are ambiguous. However, our empirical estimation implies a concave
labor income and a convex labor costs function. Moreover, non-concave or non-convex labor
supply or demand functions, respectively, make the FHM approach analytically less traceable.
As regards content, the observed curvature properties imply increasing VTC’s or heterogeneity
that overcompensates decreasing VTCs. Our modeling strategy has the following advantages
when compared to former approaches:
(1) The approach allows to analyze simultaneously ﬁxed, proportional and variable
marginal transaction costs as well as heterogeneity. Compared to existing approaches taking
only FTC and PTC into account, in our approach non-separability not only occurs if house-
holds are autarkic, but can also occur when households actually participate in labor markets. (2)
In contrast to most empirical analyses of interdependent FHMs using reduced forms of a non-
separable FHM we estimate a full non-separable FHM based on ﬂexible functional forms on the
production and consumption side. (3) Our model is applicable for several kinds of labor market
imperfections, e.g. institutional restrictions like binding hours settled by collective agreements,
transaction costs due to search, monitoring or commuting costs or heterogeneity of family and
non-family or heterogeneity of on-farm and off-farm labor (Low, 1982, 1986). (4) Our approach
allows an analysis of farm household decisions under various labor market regimes including
the case that farms simultaneously hire on-farm labor and sell off-farm labor, a case which is
theoretically excluded if only FTCs and PTCs are analyzed and labor is treated as homogeneous
2(Sadoulet et al., 1998). (5) We provide a simple empirical test for separability of the FHM
approach.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2 the theoretical model is
described, while chapter 3 presents the comparative static of the model. The empirical speciﬁ-
cation is illustrated in chapter 4 and the estimation results using individual household data from
several regions in Mid-West Poland are presented in chapter 5. Tests show that the model is
signiﬁcantly non-separable due to increasing VTC and heterogeneity of off-farm family labor
and hired on-farm labor. Based on the estimated parameters we derive price elasticities cap-
turing quantitatively consumption, production, and labor market reactions for the separable and
non-separable FHM. Except for labor supply and crop production, price elasticities differ only
slightly for the non-separable and separable FHM. However, for crop production we derive an
inverse supply response.
2 THE MODEL
To concentrate on the role of labor market constraints, we construct a static model that ig-
nores some aspects of farmers’ decisions, notably (price) risk (Finkelshtain and Chalfant, 1991;
Fafchamps, 1992) and credit constraints (Chambers and Lopez, 1987). The model framework
can cover both the case of imperfect and, with few rearrangements, perfect labor markets. The
farm household is assumed to maximize utility derived from consumption and leisure subject to
a technology constraint (2), a time constraint (3), and a budget constraint (4). Therefore, farm
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Here U (c) is the farm household’s utility function, which is assumed to be monotoni-
cally increasing and strictly concave. c is a vector of consumption goods consisting of market
commodities (Cm), self-produced agricultural goods (Ca), and leisure (CL).
Production technology is represented by a multi-output, multi-input production func-
tion (2), which is assumed to be well behaved in the usual sense (Lau, 1978a). Here x 2 PG is
a vector of production goods, expressed as netputs, and r is a vector of quasi-ﬁxed factors. The
farm household is assumed to produce market (Xc > 0) and home-consumed (Xa > 0) agricul-
tural goods using variable inputs (Xv < 0), labor (XL < 0), and the quasi-ﬁxed factors land (Rg)
and capital (Rk).
The farm household faces a time constraint (3), where TL denotes the total time avail-
able. jXLj = X
f
L +Xh













L indicates off-farm family labor andCL the leisure of the fam-
ily members. In general, four regimes of labor market participation are possible. First, the farm
household sells family labor and hires labor at the same time. Second, farmers neither sell nor
hire labor (autarky). Third and fourth, they either sell or hire labor.
3The budget constraint (4) states that a household’s consumption expenditures (left-hand
side) must not exceed its monetary income (right-hand side). The household may receive in-
come from farming and from off-farm employment. In addition, it receives (E > 0) or pays
(E < 0) transfers, which are determined exogenously. Here, Pi; i = m;a;c;v denote the exoge-
nous consumer and producer prices. Due to the empirical evidence in our data, we suppose that
the (average) household is a net supplier of the self-produced agricultural goods (Xa Ca > 0).







L), respectively. In particular, we assume that supply of off-farm labor and








tively, where marginal transaction costs can be constant, e.g. proportional transportation and
marketing costs, or variable, e.g. bargaining, controlling and enforcement costs that vary with








are linear in Xs
L and Xh
L, respectively. In general marginal transaction costs are not
observable (see Key et al., 2000), however, some factors that explain these transaction costs can
be observed. Let zs
t and zh
t denote the factors explaining transaction costs of the farm household
for selling or buying labor, respectively.
Moreover, we assume that family members have heterogeneous skills to work off-farm
and therefore receive different off-farm wages. We further assume that the order in which family
members work off-farm corresponds to their skills implying that off-farm wage is a step-wise
decreasing function of off-farm labor supply. As long as speciﬁc skills and off-farm wages of
different family members cannot be observed, heterogeneity can be modeled using a continuous






s denotes the average regional labor wage, where zs
L denotes the factors explain-
ing heterogeneity of family labor regarding off-farm work and bs(Xs
L;zs
L) denotes increase or
decrease in the labor wage expected by the farm household, where according to our expositions
above bs is non-increasing in labor supply. Obviously, taking heterogeneity and variable trans-
action costs into account, the effective revenues from off-farm employment result as a functions



























where ds equals one, if Xs






denotes ﬁxed transaction costs and
zs
f are factors explaining ﬁxed transaction costs of supplying off-farm labor.
Analogously, to introduce heterogeneity of on-farm labor, we assume that the agricul-
tural labor wage is constant, while the productivity of on-farm labor varies across hired workers
(Benjamin, 1992). Assuming the order in which workers are hired corresponds to on-farm pro-
ductivity implies that the effective on-farm wage is a step-wise increasing function of hired
on-farm labor. Again as long as productivity variances of hired on-farm workers are not ob-











h denotes the average regional agricultural labor wage, where zh
L denotes the





denotes an increase or
decrease of the effective labor wage expected by the farm household. Again, according to our
4expositions above bh is non-decreasing in labor demand. Obviously, taking heterogeneity and
variable transaction costs on the labor demand side into account, the effective labor costs result




































where dh equals one, if Xh






denotes ﬁxed transaction costs and
zh
f are factors explaining ﬁxed transaction costs of demanding on-farm labor.
Using the labor income and cost function g and f, respectively, the budget constraint
can be expressed as in (4). As mentioned above (see section 1), this framework is applicable
for several kinds of labor market imperfections including ﬁxed, constant marginal (proportional)
and variable marginal transaction costs as well as heterogeneity. It follows directly from the
deﬁnition of f and g above that curvature properties of these functions correspond to market
imperfection. For example, in the absence of heterogeneity and variable marginal transaction


























Hence, once households participate in labor markets marginal off-farm income or
marginal costs for hired labor are equal to the exogenously given wage rate (PL) corrected for
proportional transaction costs (TCs
p and TCh
p). Thus, if households participate at least in one la-
bor market the farm household model becomes separable and delivers standard microeconomic
comparative static results (Sadoulet et al., 1998). Of course, if ﬁxed or proportional transaction
costs are too high, households still abstain from labor market participation and stay autarkic
implying a non-separable FHM (Key et al., 2000). In contrast, when labor markets are assumed
to be imperfectly competitive due to heterogeneity or variable marginal transaction costs both
functions become nonlinear. In this case, the price of family labor (P
L) is endogenously
determined and the production and consumption decisions are simultaneously determined by
the solution of the equation system (1) to (4). Note in particular that in contrast to ﬁxed or
proportional transaction costs, in case of heterogeneity or variable marginal transaction costs
non-separability results although households actually participate in labor markets. However,
although non-linearity of the f or g function clearly indicates labor market imperfection due
to heterogeneity or variable marginal transaction costs or both, it is generally impossible to
derive the partial impacts of variable marginal transaction costs or heterogeneity from observed
curvature properties of the f and g functions alone.
As the FTC creates discontinuities in the f and g functions, the solutions to the maxi-
mization problem (1)-(4) cannot be found by simply solving the ﬁrst order conditions. Thus, we
follow Key et al. (2000) and decompose the solution in two steps. At the ﬁrst step we solve for
the optimal solution conditional on the labor market participation regime (dh and ds), and then
choosing the market participation regime that leads to the highest level of utility. Thus, assuming
there exists an interior solution for a given labor market regime (dh and ds) the optimal quantities
of consumption and production goods, and the allocation of time, are determined (l;f;µ > 0;
Cm;Ca;CL;Xc;Xa > 0, XL;Xv < 0, Xs
L > 0 if ds = 1 and Xs
L = 0 otherwise, and Xh
L > 0 if dh = 1
and Xh
L = 0 otherwise).
¶U(:)
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PiCi = 0 (14)
G(x;r) = 0 (15)
TL+XL+dhXh
L  dsXs
L CL = 0 (16)
Here l;f > 0 are Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget and the technology
constraints, respectively. P
L = µ=l denotes the unobservable internal wage in the case of non-
separability, where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the time constraint. In the
separable version, P
L indicates the exogenous wage rate.
In general, comparative static derived from the equations system (10) to (16) differs for
each of the four labor market regimes. However, for simplicity in the next chapter we will focus
comparative static onthe regime ds;dh =1, i.e. assuming that the farmhousehold simultaneously
supplies off-farm labor and demands on-farm labor. Note also that we empirically identiﬁed this
regime as the dominant labor market regime in our farm survey of Mid-West Poland.
3 COMPARATIVE STATIC
To facilitate the comparative static analysis we transform the primal decision problem (1)-(4)
into a dual representation (Diewert, 1982). First we deﬁne a dual restricted proﬁt function
P(p;r)  maxxfpxjG(x;r) = 0g, where p is the price vector of the production goods and
P(p;r) is the maximal proﬁt. Following Hotelling’s lemma, the optimal quantities of production
goods are deﬁned by ¶P(:)=¶Pi = Xi(p;r); 8i 2 fc;a;v;Lg.







Here p is the price vector of the consumption goods and U0 is the obtainable utility level. Ac-





; 8i 2 fm;a;Lg. Substituting the indirect utility function V (p;Y) for
U0, it holds thatCH
i (p;V (p;Y)) Ci(p;Y). Thus, the Hicksian demand at utilityV (p;Y) is the
same as the Marshallian demand at income Y.




L) and the demand for hired labor Xh
L = Xh
L (P
L) as implicit functions of the
endogenous labor price (P
L).
























Equation (17) implicitly deﬁnes the shadow wage (P
L) around the optimal solution of
the non-separable model. Hence, P
L = c(p;r;TL;E) is an implicit function of exogenous prices
6for consumption and production goods (p), ﬁxed resources (r), total time available (TL) and
exogenous transfers (E).
Based on the above deﬁned functions, we can derive farm households’ consumption,






to changes in any of the exogenous
prices (Pjjj = c;a;v;m). In the case of non-separability, we can decompose the farm household



















The ﬁrst term (direct component) on the right-hand side represents the supply or demand reac-
tions to changes in the exogenous prices assuming a constant endogenous labor price (P
L). The
second term (indirect component) represents the adjustments to the changes in the internal wage
rate caused by changes in the same exogenous price.
In order to determine the indirect component of the non-separable version, we have to
derive the shadow price adjustment from equation (17), applying the implicit function theorem































































The numerator on the right-hand side represents the change in the time allocation due
to increasing exogenous prices. The denominator of equation (20) indicates the change in the
time allocation caused by changes in the internal wage rate. Given the convexity of P(:) and the
concavity of e(:) in prices the denominator is always positive as long as it is assumed that g(:)
is convex in Xh
L and f (:) is concave in Xs
L,

























































Equation (21) indicates the production adjustments, where the ﬁrst term on the right-
hand side denotes the direct component and the second term is the indirect component. Equation
(22) represents households’ consumption responses, where the ﬁrstand second term on the right-
hand side are the direct substitution and income effects, respectively, and the third term denotes
the corresponding indirect component. The last two equations (23) and (24) represent farm
households’ adjustments regarding the supply of family labor off-farm and the demand for hired
labor, respectively. These adjustments include only the indirect component.
7Assuming separability, farm households’ production and consumption adjustments co-
incide with the direct components of the non-separable version. Labor market adjustments resid-

















L is net supply of labor.
Based on equations (20) to (24), we derive the complete comparative static for all ex-
ogenous prices. In particular, we compare the adjustments within the non-separable version with
those of the separable framework. The results are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Theoretical effects of exogenous price changes
non-separable model separable model
Pc Pa Pv Pm Pc Pa Pv PL Pm
farm Xc ? ? ? ? + ? (-) (-) 0
Xa ? ? ? ? ? + (-) (-) 0
jXvj ? ? ? ? (+) (+) - (-) 0
jXLj ? ? ? ? (+) (+) (-) - 0
consumption Cm (+) (+) (-) ? (+) (+) (-) (+) (-)
Ca (+) ? (-) ? (+) ? (-) (+) ?
CL ? ? ? ? (+) (+) (-) ? ?
labor market Xsn
L (-) (-) (+) ? (-) (-) (+) (+) ?
Xs
L (-) (-) (+) ?
Xh
L (+) (+) (-) ?
P
L (+) (+) (-) ?
Notes: It is assumed that goods are not inferior, technologies are not regressive, and households are net
supplier of labor and self-produced agricultural goods.
0 = clear, no effect;
+/- = clear, increase/decrease;
(+)/(-) = unclear, but most likely an increase/decrease (assuming labor and variable
inputs are complements, and consumption goods are net-substitutes);
? = unclear.
Comparative static results suggest that when labor market imperfections occur all allo-
cation effects are theoretically ambiguous, mainly caused by undetermined or partly counteract-
ing shadow price components. However, assuming labor and variable inputs are complements
and consumption goods are net-substitutes, the direction of most labor market reactions and
some consumption adjustments becomes clear. In this case the internal wage rate increases with
increasing prices of agricultural outputs (Pc;Pa) and decreasing variable input prices (Pv).
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the adjustment effects in the farm household
framework differ between the non-separable and the separable model version (table 1). That is,
labor market imperfections have an impact on adjustments to exogenous price changes.
4 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
To clarify the direction and quantify the extent of the farm household reactions, we estimate
a fully speciﬁed non-separable farm household model. Based on the estimated parameters we
derive price elasticities, which capture production, consumption and labor market reactions.
The farm household model is speciﬁed as follows. The production decisions are repre-
sented by a multi-output, multi-input proﬁt function from the symmetric normalized quadratic
8(SNQ)2 form (Diewert and Wales, 1987, 1992; Kohli, 1993). To ensure global convexity, we
apply the method proposed by Koebel et al. (2000, 2003) (see below). The consumption deci-
sions of the farm households are speciﬁed by an AIDS consumer demand system (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980). To include imperfection of labor markets we assume a quadratic form for
the labor cost (g) and labor income (f) function, respectively.3
The econometric estimation of the proposed model is carried out in four steps. First,
we determine the internal wage of the household by estimating the shadow price of labor on
the farm. Methodologically we follow Lopez (1984) who estimated a restricted proﬁt function
with labor as a quasi-ﬁx factor. Assuming constant returns to labor Lopez (1984) could directly
derive shadow prices of labor from the estimated proﬁt function. In this case the SNQ proﬁt
function is deﬁned as follows:































































Here, n indicates the observation (household), P is the proﬁt function, PL is the proﬁt
function per unit of labor, XLn is the labor deployed on the farm and wn = åi2fc;a;vgqiPin is






; i 2 fc;a;vg are the
weights of the individual netput prices. Further, pn = (Pan;Pcn;Pvn) indicate the price indices
of the netputs and Xin; i 2 fc;a;vg denote the quantity indices of the netputs. rn = (Rgn;Rkn)
represent the quasi-ﬁxed factors land (Rg) and capital (Rk), and a, b, d, g are the parameters to be
estimated. To identify all b coefﬁcients, we impose the following restrictions: åj2fc;a;vgbijPj =
0; i 2 fc;a;vg, where Pj are the mean prices (Diewert and Wales, 1987, p. 54).





In the second step we analyze the labor supply and labor demand of the households. It
follows from our theoretical model, that if a household participates as a seller in the off-farm
labor market, the internal wage rate P
L equals the effective off-farm labor wage Ps
L, while if a
household participates as a buyer in the on-farm labor market the internal wage rate P
L equals the
effective on-farm labor wage Ph
L. Thus, the corresponding labor supply and demand functions
could be econometrically estimated based on equations (6) and (8), respectively. However, since
labor supply and labor demand are contingent on the decision of the household to participate as a
seller or buyer in the off-farm and on-farm labor market, respectively (Greene, 2002), estimating
labor supply or labor demand functions might be plagued by a sample selection (simultaneity)
bias. To account for a sample selection bias, that generally can occur when supply or demand
functions are estimated under market imperfection, a two-stage switching regression model with
endogenous switching can be applied (Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000; Sadoulet et al., 1998). For
9our special case this approach corresponds to the Heckman sample selection model (Heckman,
1976).4
Following the Heckman procedure, estimating labor supply includes two regression
equations, one equation determining sample selection at the ﬁrst stage and a second regression





n = 1 if ds
n > 0 and ds






n observed when ds
n = 1 (30)
The ﬁrst part of the Heckman procedure is represented by a probit estimation of the
ﬁrst sample selection equation and the second part corresponds to a normal OLS regression
of the effective labor wage equation including the inverse Mills ratio as additional explanatory
variable (Greene, 2002). In (29) zs
n corresponds to factors explaining participation in the off-farm
labor market, which include factors explaining ﬁxed transaction costs, zs
f, variable transaction
costs, zs
t, as well as factors explaining heterogeneity, zs
L. However, at this stage of analysis we
don’t want to distinguish explicitly between these various factors. In particular, we include the
following variables in zs: Dc a dummy variable that is one if there are children in the household
(family members younger than 14 years), Rg the amount of land farmed by the household, Nw
the number of family members in working age (between 14 and 60 years old), Ah and Ah
2, the
age and squared age of the head of the family, D f a dummy variable that is one if the head of the
family is female and zero otherwise, Dr; r 2 [1;8] dummy variables for eight different regions.
In (30) zzs
n corresponds to factors explaining the effective off-farm labor wage, which
partly include factors of variable transaction costs, zs
t, as well as factors explaining heterogeneity,
zs
L. In particular, besides Df, Nw, Ah, Ah
2 and Dr r 2 [1;8] zzs includes Dp as a dummy variable
that is one if one or more family members are permanently employed outside the farm. us
n and es
n
are error terms, which are assumed to be jointly normal distributed, and bs and gs are parameters
to be estimated.
Analogously tolabor supply the labor demand function is estimated following the Heck-
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n > 0 and dh






n observed when dh
n = 1 (32)
where in (31) zh
n corresponds to factors explaining participation in the on-farm labor
market, which include factors explaining ﬁxed transaction costs, zh
f, variable transaction costs,
zh
t , as well as factors explaining heterogeneity, zh
L. However, at this stage of analysis we don’t
want to distinguish explicitly between these various factors. In particular, we include the follow-
ing variables in zh: Dc, Rg, Nw, Ah and Ah
2, Df, Dr; r 2 [1;8] and Dp, while beside Rg and Dr;
r 2 [1;8] we only include one additional dummy variable Do that is one if workers are hired via
a cooperative and zero otherwise in zzh in (32). uh
n and eh
n are error terms, which are assumed to
be jointly normal distributed, and betah and gh are parameters to be estimated.
The off-farm labor revenue function (f (Xs




















































where as and ah are unknown parameters, which could account for ﬁxed transaction costs.
A concave labor revenue function (f) requires a negative parameter bs
x and a convex
cost function for hired labor (g) requires a positive parameter bh
x. If the estimated parameters
bs
x and bh
x have the right sign, the standard errors of these parameters returned by the Heck-
man estimation allow to test by a simple t-test if the labor revenue and labor cost function are
signiﬁcantly concave and convex, respectively.
In the third step we again estimate the netput equations of a SNQ proﬁt func-
tion. However, this time we consider labor as variable input. Thus, we have four netputs
(Xi; i 2 fc;a;v;Lg) and two quasi-ﬁxed inputs (Ri; i 2 fg;kg). The price of labor (PL) is taken























In the last step we estimate the household’s consumption decisions via an AIDS con-
sumer demand system consisting of three commodity groups: purchased commodities (Cm),
self-produced consumption goods (Ca), and leisure (CL). The following speciﬁcation is used
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980):















Here, Win = PinCin=Yn; i 2 fm;a;Lg are the budget shares, where Yn indicates the full
income. Ãn is the translog consumer price index, Pin; i 2 fm;a;Lg indicate the consumer price
indices oftheaggregated commodity groups, and a,b,and garethe parameters tobeestimated5.
5 DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Data used for the estimations are based on an accounting survey of 202 agricultural households
in several regions around Poznan (Mid-West Poland) in 1994. The data were collected and
published by the Institute for Agriculture and Food Industries (IERiGZ) in Warsaw.
On the production side, market goods (Xc) consist of all crop products, while animal
products are considered as (possibly) home-consumed goods (Xa). All relevant variable inputs











. Land (Rg) and capital (Rk) are considered as quasi-ﬁxed factors. On the consumption
side, Cm includes all purchased consumption goods. The self-produced goods (Ca) correspond
conceptually to the home-consumed animal products (Xa). The amount of leisure (CL) is de-
termined by calculating the yearly available time (TL) of households (household members older









11The sample contains two farms that do not produce any animal products. These two
farm households are removed from the sample to have a more homogeneous sample and to
avoid an imputation of the unknown prices of animal products. Appendix table A1 gives an
overview of main sample characteristics.
All estimations and calculations are carried out by the (free) statistical software “R” (R
Development Core Team, 2004, see also http://www.r-project.org), using the add-on packages
“micEcon” (Henningsen, 2005) and “systemﬁt” (Hamann and Henningsen, 2004).
5.1 Estimation results
In the ﬁrst step the three netput equations of the SNQ proﬁt function (27) are estimated. The
estimation results are presented in appendix table A2. The R2 values are 0.71, 0.29 and 0.69 for
Xc, Xa and Xv, respectively, and more than 75% of the parameters are signiﬁcantly different from
zero.
While the homogeneity and symmetry conditions are imposed in this estimation, the
monotonicity and convexity conditions are checked afterwards. For our results monotonicity is
fulﬁlled at all observations, but the estimated proﬁt function is not convex in prices. In a ﬁrst
attempt, we tried to impose convexity by a non-linear estimation using the Cholesky decompo-
sition (Lau, 1978b). Since the estimation of the restricted non-linear netput equations did not
converge, we choose a new procedure suggested by Koebel et al. (2000, 2003). It is based on
the minimum distance and asymptotic least squares estimation (Gourieroux et al., 1985; Kodde
et al., 1990), and is asymptotically equivalent to a (successful) non-linear estimation with con-
vexity imposed. First, the estimation results of the unrestricted (linear) netput equations are
used to calculate the Hessian matrix of the unrestricted proﬁt function. Second, the weighted
difference between this unrestricted and a restricted Hessian is minimized. Finally, restricted
coefﬁcients are identiﬁed by an asymptotic least squares (ALS) framework.
The weighting matrix for the minimization of the difference between the unrestricted
and the restricted Hessian is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the Hessian, which
can be derived from the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefﬁcients. To restrict the
Hessian to be positive semi-deﬁnite we use the Cholesky factorization.6
The parameter estimates and R2 values of the restricted proﬁt function are presented in
appendix table A3. The R2 values are almost identical to the unrestricted model. This shows that
the data do not unreasonably contradict the convexity constraint. The homogeneity and symme-
try conditions are not affected by the imposition of convexity, and monotonicity is still fulﬁlled
for all observations. Thus, the estimated proﬁt function fully complies with microeconomic
theory.
Theshadow prices of labor calculated from the restricted proﬁt function have reasonable
values for all but one farm household. This farm household has a negative shadow price and,
therefore, itis removed fromthe sample. Hence, the sample used for thefurther analysis includes
199 farm households.
In the second step the labor supply and demand of the households are analyzed. The
results regarding thesupply oflabor (eq. (30) and (29)) areshown on theleft-hand side of table 2.
The probability that the household supplies labor increases signiﬁcantly if the number of family
members in working age increases, if the head of the household is female, if there are children
in this household, and if the household resides in region 4 (Leszczynskie). The R2 value of the
estimated shadow price equation for labor supplying households is 0.36. The shadow prices are
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the amount of supplied labor, the age of the head of the family and
12Table 2: Estimated Coefﬁcients of Labor Market Analysis
labor supply labor demand
Regressor 1st step: probit 2nd step: OLS 1st step: probit 2nd step: OLS





Nw 0.144 * -1.803 -0.291 ***
Dc 0.523 **
Dp 6.681 -0.356
Ah -0.017 2.232 ** -0.045
Df 0.481 * -7.714 -0.135
A2
h 0.000 -0.025 ** 0.000
Do 13.024
Rg -0.013 0.062 *** 0.868 ***
D2 -0.048 -25.110 *** -0.209 -20.033 ***
D3 0.335 -19.247 *** -0.407 -18.050 **
D4 0.843 ** -13.432 * -0.006 1.869
D5 0.519 -9.904 -0.076 -15.514 **
D6 -0.552 -5.240 1.046 ** -16.473 **
D7 0.047 5.894 0.344 12.298
D8 0.444 -17.056 ** -0.131 -12.601
IMR -4.646 -1.454
R2 0.359 0.509
Notes: IMR = inverse Mills ratio.
”*”, ”**” and ”***” denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
the region. The estimated parameter of the inverse Mills ratio is not signiﬁcantly different from
zero, indicating that there is no sample selection bias. As expected the estimated parameter of
the amount of supplied labor is negative. Hence, the labor revenue function is concave with
respect to supplied labor.
The results regarding the demand for hired labor (eq. (32) and (31)) are shown on the
right-hand side of table 2. The probability that the household hires labor increases signiﬁcantly
with an increasing amount of land, with a decreasing number of family members in working
age, and if the household resides in region 6 (Poznanskie). The R2 value of the estimated shadow
price equation for labor hiring households is0.51. Theshadow prices are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by the amount of hired labor, the amount of land and the region. As on the labor supply side the
estimated parameter of the inverse Mills ratio is not signiﬁcantly different from zero, indicating
that there is no sample selection bias for labor hiring households. As expected the estimated
parameter of the amount of supplied labor is positive. Hence, the labor cost function is convex
with respect to hired labor.
In the third step the four netput equations of the SNQ proﬁt function (35) are estimated.
The parameter estimates and R2 values are presented in appendix table A4. The R2 values
are 0.74, 0.49, 0.82 and 0.28 for Xc, Xa, Xv, and XL, respectively, and more than half of the
parameters are signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Again, the homogeneity and symmetry conditions are imposed in the estimation, and
the monotonicity and convexity condition are checked afterwards. Monotonicity is fulﬁlled at
97.5% of the observations, but the estimated proﬁt function is not convex in prices. Hence,
convexity is enforced using the same method as for the proﬁt function in the ﬁrst step. The
13parameter estimates and R2 values of the restricted proﬁt function are presented in appendix
table A5. Again, the R2 values are almost identical to the unrestricted model showing that
the data do not unreasonably contradict the convexity constraint. Since the homogeneity and
symmetry conditions are maintained in the imposition of convexity, and the restricted proﬁt
function fulﬁlls monotonicity at 97.0% of the observations, microeconomic theory is satisﬁed
for almost the complete sample.
In the fourth step the three budget share equations of the Almost Ideal Demand System
(36) are estimated. The estimation results are presented in appendix table A6. The R2 values are
0.36, 0.55 and 0.46 for Wm,Wa and WL, respectively, and almost all parameters are signiﬁcantly
different from zero. While the adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry conditions are imposed
on the estimated parameters, the monotonicity and concavity condition are checked after the
estimation. Forour results monotonicity is fulﬁlled at 99.5% of the observations and concavity is
fulﬁlled at 85.9% of the observations. Thus, the estimated demand system meets the conditions
derived from microeconomic demand theory at a very large range of the sample.
5.2 Elasticities
The traditional price elasticities on production side and the traditional price and income elastic-
ities on demand side are presented in appendix tables A7 and A8, respectively. We compute the
price elasticities in the farm household complex as a function of the relevant traditional price and
income elasticities. All these elasticities are based on the underlying estimated parameters and
calculated using the sample mean values of the relevant variables. These elasticities correspond
to the differentials in the comparative static analysis.
Table 3: Price elasticities
non-separable model separable model
Pc Pa Pv Pm Pc Pa Pv PL Pm
Xc -0.11 0.50 -0.22 0.08 0.14 0.79 -0.52 -0.41 0.00
Xa 0.41 0.37 -0.72 0.03 0.50 0.47 -0.83 -0.14 0.00
Xv 0.30 0.78 -1.06 0.01 0.33 0.82 -1.09 -0.05 0.00
XL 0.06 -0.16 0.30 0.10 0.38 0.21 -0.08 -0.52 0.00
Cm 0.40 0.64 -0.53 -0.73 0.16 0.37 -0.26 0.42 -0.65
Ca 0.20 -0.46 -0.29 0.50 0.15 -0.51 -0.24 0.12 0.52
CL 0.28 0.41 -0.48 -0.14 0.36 0.51 -0.58 -0.03 -0.17
Xsn
L -11.14 -12.69 12.94 3.56 -19.50 -22.21 22.64 9.31 6.23
Xs
L -4.10 -4.67 4.75 1.31
Xh
L 3.74 4.26 -4.34 -1.19
X
f
L -0.16 -0.43 0.58 0.18
PL 0.63 0.71 -0.73 -0.20
Table 3 gives an overview of the elasticities within the non-separable and the separable
framework. In the non-separable model the exogenous prices that directly inﬂuence the produc-
tion side have a considerable impact on the internal wage rate with shadow price elasticities of
0.63, 0.71 and -0.71 for Pc, Pa and Pv, respectively. On the other hand the price of commercial
consumption good has a much less impact on the internal wage rate with a shadow price elastic-
ity of -0.20. Interestingly, we observe in the non-separable model an inverse supply response to
own-price changes of the produced market good (Xc).
As expected, most important differences between the two model versions are found
regarding the labor market reactions. The adjustments of (net) supplied labor, consumed leisure
14and labor deployed on the farm are generally smaller if there are labor market imperfections
(non-separable model) compared to a situation without labor market imperfections (separable
model). However, most differences between the non-separable and the separable model are
moderate.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of price responses of farm households
under imperfect labor markets in Mid-West Poland. In particular, an interdependent FHM ap-
proach is derived that explicitly takes transaction costs and heterogeneity of labor into account.
The approach contains the following advantages: (i) In contrast to existing approaches, which
take only ﬁxed (FTC) and constant marginal (proportional, PTC) transaction costs into account,
our approach additionally takes variable marginal transaction costs as well as heterogeneity of
labor into account. (ii) In contrast to most empirical analyses of interdependent FHMs, which
use reduced forms of a non-separable FHM, we estimate a full non-separable FHM based on
ﬂexible functional forms on the production and consumption side. In particular, applying a new
method proposed by Koebel et al. (2000, 2003) allows us to ensure global convexity of the proﬁt
function, which is always a problem when estimating ﬂexible proﬁt functions. (iii) The approach
is applicable for several kinds of labor market imperfections, e.g. institutional restrictions like
binding hours settled by collective agreements, transaction costs due to search, monitoring or
commuting costs or heterogeneity of family and non-family or heterogeneity of on-farm and
off-farm labor. (iv) It allows an analysis of farm household decisions under various labor mar-
ket regimes including the case that farms simultaneously hire on-farm labor and sell off-farm
labor, a case which is theoretically excluded if only FTCs and PTCs are analyzed and labor is
treated as homogeneous good. (v) It provides a simple empirical test for separability of the FHM
approach.
Theoretical analysis delivers the following results: In contrast to former approaches
taking only FTC and PTC into account, in our more general approach non-separability not only
occurs if households are autarkic, but can also occur when households actually participate in
labor markets. Comparative static analyses suggest that when labor markets are imperfect price
responses of the farm household are generally ambiguous mainly due to counteracting shadow
price effects. Furthermore, price responses generally differ between the non-separable and the
separable model version indicating the potential importance of interdependent FHM as the ade-
quate tool of agricultural policy analysis when labor markets are imperfect. However, for most
price responses econometric analysis using individual household data from Mid-West Poland in-
dicates only moderate differences between the two model versions. Exemptions are crop produc-
tion andlabor market supply, respectively, for whichsigniﬁcant differences inprice responses for
the separable and non-separable FHM have been found. For crop production the non-separable
FHM indicates an inverse supply response.
NOTES
1Christian H.C.A. Henning is Full Professor and Arne Henningsen is Ph.D. student, Depart-
ment of Agricultural Economics, University of Kiel, Germany. Paper presented at the EAAE
Seminar on Institutional Units in Agriculture, held in Wye, UK, April 9-10, 2005.
2This functional form is also traded under the name of “symmetric generalized McFadden
function”.
153The quadratic form can be interpreted as a second order approximation of the true labor cost
and income functions.
4Estimating labor supply and labor demand functions using two separate Heckman models
we implicitly assume that the decisions to participate in the off-farm and on-farm labor market
are independent from each other, i.e. the error terms of the probit regression determining off-
farm and on-farm labor market participation are uncorrelated. Otherwise, we would have to
apply a bivariate probit model estimating both equations simultaneously (Greene, 2002). For
simplicity we assume that participation decisions are independent although in general we could
also estimate a bivariate probit model.
5The simultaneous nonlinear estimation of the translog total price index together with the
demand system, which share the same set of coefﬁcients, usually results in estimation problems
(Michalek and Keyzer, 1992). In order to avoid these problems, as well as to avoid difﬁculties
of approximating the translog price index by, say, a Stone index (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980),
we chose an iterative estimation procedure proposed by Michalek and Keyzer (1992, p. 145).
6 To retain convexity of the SNQ proﬁt function, it is sufﬁcient to minimize the difference
between the estimated (unrestricted) b-coefﬁcients and the (linearly independent) values of a
restricted b-coefﬁcient matrix (Koebel, 1998). This procedure only allows to adjust the b-
coefﬁcients, while the approach of Koebel et al. (2000, 2003) adjusts all coefﬁcients. Thus,
the ﬁt of the constrained model is much better, due to the ﬂexibility of the other coefﬁcients.
Both approaches ‘produce’ the same b’s.
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18Appendix A: Tables
Table A1: Characteristics of the Sample
variable unit mean minimum maximum std.deviation
PcXc 1000 PLZ 132258 10451 1189412 133724
PaXa 1000 PLZ 212570 2669 2526524 239835
PvXv 1000 PLZ 211960 13480 2204671 213479
PmCm 1000 PLZ 91469 26365 280176 42853
PaCa 1000 PLZ 19041 1625 41853 7606
XL hours 3686 400 9843 1717
Xh
L hours 211 0 2085 365
Xs
L hours 446 0 4000 876
Xs
L Xh
L hours 235 -2085 4000 1002
X
f
L hours 3475 400 9236 1705
CL hours 8716 1361 22698 4172
Rg ha 14.7 1.2 101.5 12.4
Rk 1000 PLZ 649191 43960 4492025 554120
Notes: Calculations are based on IERiGZ (1995). PLZ = Polish Zloty.
Table A2: Estimation Results of 1st step Proﬁt Function (unrestricted)
Parameter i = c i = a i = v
ai -1.72 (-0.73) 20.12 (4.31) -17.36 (-5.14)
bic -14.85 (-1.12) 19.77 (2.68) -4.92 (-0.37)
bia 19.77 (2.68) 61.62 (5.76) -81.39 (-8.04)
biv -4.92 (-0.37) -81.39 (-8.04) 86.31 (5.08)
dig 6258 (11.37) 1002 (0.93) -4306 (-5.37)




R2 0.71 0.29 0.69
Notes: t-values in parentheses. The standard errors of the coefﬁcients that have not been directly
estimated are calculated with the formula of Klein (1953, p. 258).
Table A3: Estimation Results of 1st step Proﬁt Function (restricted)
Parameter i = c i = a i = v
ai -2.28 20.31 -17.03
bic 3.31 14.64 -17.95
bia 14.64 64.69 -79.32
biv -17.95 -79.32 97.27
dig 6169 1024 -4294




R2 0.71 0.28 0.69
19Table A4: Estimation Results of Final Proﬁt Function (unrestricted)
Parameter i = c i = a i = v i = L
ai -29632 (4.31) 31200 (-0.73) -3850 (-1.12) -62575 (-5.14)
bic 12679 (0.24) 104118 (3.04) -78518 (-1.47) -38279 (-5.09)
bia 104118 (3.04) 101865 (1.61) -188508 (-3.49) -17475 (-1.30)
biv -78518 (-1.47) -188508 (-3.49) 253009 (3.42) 14016 (1.23)
biL -38279 (-5.09) -17475 (-1.30) 14016 (1.23) 41739 (8.33)
dig 6980 (11.91) 336 (0.31) -6324 (-7.49) -3220 (-9.22)




R2 0.74 0.49 0.82 0.28
Notes: t-values in parentheses. The standard errors of the coefﬁcients that have not been directly
estimated are calculated with the formula of Klein (1953, p. 258).
Table A5: Estimation Results of Final Proﬁt Function (restricted)
Parameter i = c i = a i = v i = L
ai -32638 32285 -3280 -62762
bic 71504 72782 -107302 -36984
bia 72782 101486 -158814 -15453
biv -107302 -158814 255517 10599
biL -36984 -15453 10599 41838
dig 6905 279 -6186 -3212




R2 0.74 0.49 0.82 0.28
Table A6: Estimation Results of the AIDS
Parameter i = m i = a i = L
ai 0.04 (0.41) 0.05 (2.22) 0.91 (9.22)
bi -0.11 (6.92) -0.03 (6.44) 0.14 (7.79)
gim 0.18 (7.56) 0.05 (4.35) -0.23 (10.27)
gia 0.05 (4.35) 0.02 (1.73) -0.07 (11.83)
giL -0.23 (10.27) -0.07 (11.83) 0.31 (12.09)
R2 0.36 0.55 0.46
Notes: t-values in parentheses. The standard errors of the coefﬁcients that have not been directly
estimated are calculated with the formula of Klein (1953, p. 258). a0 is set to 16.7, because this value
gives the highest likelihood value of the AIDS Model.
Table A7: Price Elasticities of (Final) Proﬁt Function (restricted)
Pc Pa Pv PL
Xc 0.566 0.563 -0.728 -0.401
Xa 0.358 0.467 -0.694 -0.131
Xv 0.458 0.686 -1.112 -0.031
XL 0.374 0.192 -0.047 -0.520
20Table A8: Price and Income elasticities - AIDS Model
Price elasticities Income
Hicksian Elasticities Marshallian Elasticities Elasticities
Pm Pa PL Pm Pa PL Y
Cm -0.517 0.145 0.372 -0.652 0.114 -0.005 0.543
Ca 0.642 -0.721 0.079 0.518 -0.749 -0.264 0.495
CL 0.134 0.007 -0.141 -0.168 -0.062 -0.977 1.206
21